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in inconsistency. It makes no great difference to the attorney whether
the Washington court chooses to solidify its position in denying restitution on the Sckweiter facts by declaring such agreements merely unenforceable, or continues to treat them as void. The court's decision
will apparently be to deny restitution in keeping with Washington case
law." Non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds will prevent only the
direct enforcement of the contract. Legal relations will continue to
be indirectly enforced, with the unenforceable contract serving as a
valid defense to the defaulting purchaser's action for restitution.
STANLEY

H. BARER

CRIMINAL LAW
Murder- Negligent Medical Treatment Intervening Between
Defendant's Act and Decedent's Death. In reviewing a murder conviction, the Washington court recently was confronted with the problem of negligent medical treatment intervening between the defendant's
act and the ensuing death. In affirming, the court apparently took
the extreme position that proximate causation is solely a jury question,
the inquiry on appeal being limited to a cause-in-fact analysis.
In State v. Little', the defendant Little and the decedent, Ross Johnson, were both inmates of the state prison at Walla Walla. In settling
a previous disagreement, Little punched and kicked Johnson about the
head, sending him to the prison hospital in a dazed and semiconscious
condition. In a cursory preliminary examination, his injuries were
diagnosed as a concussion with possible skull fracture and brain
damage. Johnson remained in a bed without side rails or other means
of restraint for five days, during which time he was described as continually "thrashing around . . . throwing his arms about."2 While at
the prison hospital, he fell out of bed five times, striking his head
against the wall, an iron radiator, and on the terrazzo floor. On the
fifth day, X-rays and a thorough examination counseled his prompt
removal via the prison doctor's station wagon to Western State Hospital, where he died before an operation could be performed.
The case presented a serious causation problem, for it was impossible
to ascertain the source of the fatal injuries. Both the beating and the
five falls had occurred before any X-rays were made. At the trial,
32

See cases cited note 4 supra.

2'57
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expert medical witnesses stated that the death had resulted from head
injuries, but specifically declined to express any opinion as to when
those injuries were sustained.3 Thus, there was a complete and absolute
lack of evidence on this point, and nothing to support a jury finding of
fact. It is hornbook law that the state has the burden of proof on every
element of the crime of murder, and that causation is an essential element.' Absent any evidence as to the direct cause of the fatal injuries,
the court was bound to assume they were caused by the falls.
The court, however, appears to have held that the beating itself could
be found to be the direct cause of death:
From the evidence in the instant case, the jury could have drawn either
one of two plausible conclusions regarding the events which culminated
in the death of Ross Johnson. The first possible conclusion as to the
cause of death was that the skull fracture and the extensive brain hemorrhaging were sustained by Johnson directly as the result of the violent

encounter with appellant. 5 ... On the basis of all the evidence referred
to above, the jury was warranted in concluding that Johnson died as a
direct result of the numerous punches and kicks inflicted upon him by

appellant. 6 (Emphasis added.)

It is arguable, however, that the quoted "holding" is made unnecessary to the result of the case by the court's further analysis, and thus
is a dictum. The court goes on to point out:
The second possible conclusion is that the fatal injuries were the result
of one or more falls by Johnson from his bed while in the prison hospital.... The jury, if it found it necessary to consider the question,
could have found that he fell because he was in a semiconscious condition and was in a bed without side rails or other means of restraint.
There could be no doubt in the jury's mind that Johnson was in bed as
a direct result of the beating administered by appellant.7
The difficulty with this approach is that it proves too little. The
court suggests that the actual source of the injuries which proved fatal
is irrelevant, pointing out that the deceased would not have been in the
hospital bed but for the acts of the defendant. Cause in fact is not the
measure of proximate, or legally recognizable, cause.' Had Johnson
3Brief for Appellant p. 42. Dr. Charles Larson, expert medical witness for the
state, testified that the fatal injuries could have been caused by the falls from bed.
4 The case recognizes this; 57 Wn.2d 516, 522, 358 P2d 120, 123 (1961).
5 State v. Little, 57 Wn.2d 516, 522, 358 P.2d 120, 123 (1961).
6 Id.at 523, 358 P.2d 124.
7Id.at 522, 358 P.2d 123.
8Little's acts were a cause in fact of the falls from bed, for without his acts the
deceased would not have been in the bed. This does not show that the altercation is in
any wN-ay a proximate cause. In Bush v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 268 (1880), a girl was
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died of food poisoning while in the hospital, no one would contend that
the defendant should be held criminally liable for the death, even
though his acts were a cause in fact.
A causation problem is presented in every case where negligent medical treatment follows a criminal battery and the final result is the death
of the victim. The assailant is not liable unless his acts were a proximate
cause of the death. The original act must be a substantial contributing
factor in the conditions which actually cause the death before proximate
causation is established. Conversely, if the medical treatment itself is
the sole cause of death, the defendant's act is excused.' This underlying
concept has found expression in a variety of shorthand rules. 10 Generally, the result depends upon the extent of the original injuries. If
such injuries are dangerous, or calculated to cause death, malpractice
which contributes to the result will not constitute a defense." However, if the original injuries are relatively minor, and the treatment
inflicts additional injuries which are the predominent cause of death,
most courts would recognize that the causal connection of the defendant's acts is too remote to bear legal responsibility. 2
In the present case, the court suggested a slightly different shorthand
rule based upon foreseeability: 1
The quality of medical care administered to the victim has no bearing
upon the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal homicide case,
hospitalized by a gunshot wound, and died from scarlet fever contracted from a physician just recovering from the disease. In reversing a conviction of murder, the court
held that when death results from improper treatment or disease not superinduced by
or resulting from the wound, the accused would not be guilty.
0 State v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283, 91 Pac. 977 (1907), gives the basis of this approach
in Washington. In that case appellant assigned error to the refusal to admit testimony
that gunshot wounds, located as they were, were not normally fatal if the best medical
treatment was given. In holding that a showing of poor medical treatment would not
be a defense, the court recognized that if unskillful treatment was the sole cause of
death it would be a defense, but if it was only shown that the negligence was a contributing cause of death, it would not be a defense.
10 Annot., 8 A.L.R. 506 (1920) ; Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1268 (1925) ; Annot., 126 A.L.R.
912 (1940). While the basic concept based on the sole and contributing cause distinction is logically clear, it is more of a final test than a worldng rule. It would solve
no problems for a jury. Thus the necessity for rules based on normal results of the
concept in common fact patterns.
11 Sharp v. State, 51 Ark. 147, 10 S.W. 228 (1889) ; State v. Bantley, 44 Conn. 537,
26 Am. Rep. 486 (1877).
12Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 138 Ky. 558, 128 S.W. 871 (1910); Bush v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 268 (1880). The severity of the original injury test is probably based
upon the near certainty that a very dangerous wound will be at least a contributory
cause of death. Even so, a few cases seem to recognize that even a serious injury
would be blameless if malpractice could be shown to be the sole cause of death. State
v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283, 91 Pac. 977 (1907).
3 Where an intervening act causes the harm, whether it is a superceding cause is
often determined by foreseeability. For a discussion of this approach, see PEuulNs,
CRrmixA. LAw 636 (1957).
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This is not to say, of course, that an unforeseeable intervening cause
would not excuse the accused from legal responsibility. Malpractice
with respect to the original injury or wound is no defense, whereas

malpractice resulting in new and different injuries which prove fatal
would be a defense. 4 (Court's citations omitted.)
This rule would also reach a correct result in terms of the basic causation concept in the great majority of cases. Malpractice with respect to
the original injury would normally leave the original injury a contributing cause, while new and different injuries would more often
constitute a sole cause of death. However, if the suggested rule were
applied to the present case, an acquittal would seem to follow. The
decedent died from his skull fractures, a new and different injury, not
from an aggravation of the concussion which he received at the hands
of the defendant. Thus the court carefully neglected any further
treatment of its rule.
As has been suggested, the lack of evidence as to the actual source
of the fatal injuries, coupled with traditional views concerning the
burden of proof in criminal cases, seems to necessitate the assumption
that the injuries were sustained in the falls from bed. Granting this,
a conviction would be improper unless the defendant's acts were a
proximate cause of the falls themselves. The application of causation
rules or concepts requires focusing attention on these falls, rather than
on the presence of the victim in the hospital.
What caused the falls? The prison hospital staff allowed Johnson
to fall from his bed on five different occasions, even though his delirium
made it obvious that some means of restraint was necessary. Such
gross negligence would clearly seem to be an independent cause of the
falls, and thus the fatal injuries. Had it been the sole cause, a logical
and desirable result would be acquittal of the defendant. However,
the delirious and violent condition of Johnson was as much a primary cause as the negligence, and this condition was induced by the
beating received at the hands of Little. The pattern formed is one of
contributing cause, rather than sole cause, the delirium completing
the causal chain between the acts of the defendant and the death.
A similiar factual pattern was presented to the Vermont Supreme
Court in State v. Rounds. 5 As here, the deceased had been hospitalized
due to a beating by the defendant. While in the hospital, the deceased
had fallen from his bed while in a delirious condition from head injuries.
14 State v. Little, 57 Wn2d 516, 521, 358 P2d 120, 123 (1961).

1. 104 Vt. 442, 160 Atl. 249 (1932).
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The evidence tended to show that the fall, rather than the beating, was
responsible for the broken ribs, the immediate cause of death. The
Vermont court recognized the causal connection to be established, as
the delirium which was responsible for the fall was caused by the acts
of the defendant, analysing it as a "cause of a cause" problem.16 The
conviction was reversed on the sole ground that some of the blows were
justified in self-defense and some were not, and it could not be proved
which caused the delirium. The Vermont court held that unless expert
medical testimony was introduced tending to show that the unjustified
blows caused the delirium, the jury was not warranted in so finding and
convicting the accused."
In Little, the court points out that the deceased fell because of his
semiconscious condition, 8 but while it is a step in the analysis, the
result is left to turn on other factors. It is submitted that without the
concurrence of this delirium in producing the falls, the conviction
cannot be supported. If Johnson had been conscious, and had fallen
on a slippery floor, a murder conviction could not properly be sustained.
In conclusion, it appears that the cut-off point of criminal responsibility could have been extended to include the occurrence of the fatal
injuries due to the continuing semiconscious condition of the victim.
However, this circumstance does not lend validity to the action of the
court in the present case. A causal connection supported only by the
mental condition of the victim, stretching over a time period of five
days, seems questionable enough to warrant the full consideration of
the jury. It seems obvious from the reported decision that the jury
received no adequate instruction or emphasis upon the sole factor that
could form a basis for their verdict. The defendant seems entitled to
a new trial with proper jury instructions.
CHARLES B. COOPER
LABOR LAW
Labor Disputes-Federal Pre-emption of Jurisdiction. The doctrine of federal pre-emption of jurisdiction over labor disputes was
given a significant application by the Washington Supreme Court in
16 The "cause of a cause" reasoning refers to the intervention of dependent causes,
as opposed to independent causes, leaving the chain of causation unbroken.
17 Concerning the necessity of expert medical testimony as to cause of death to
support a homicide conviction, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 693, 703 (1953). See also
State v. Bozovich, 145 Wash. 227, 259 Pac. 395 (1927). No Washington case has
required expert medical testimony in support of a conviction, but the lack of authority
is probably due to the practice of providing it where there is any doubt as to medical
cause.
Is State v. Little, 57 Wn.2d 516, 522, 358 P.2d 120, 123 (1961).

